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   PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL 
ENACTMENTS IN VIEW OF THE IRCA 
PREEMPTION SAVINGS CLAUSE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, state and local governments have, in increasing measure, enacted legislation that 
directly or indirectly affects aliens working or living in the United States.  In 2007, 1562 bills 
introduced in state legislatures directly or indirectly regulating aliens, representing a three-fold 
increase over the prior year.1  Of these proposals, 240 have become law, and a further 12 bills 
passed but were defeated by a governor’s veto.2  Added to this volume of state activity are an 
increasing number of local enactments.3  
 Those recent state statues that have touched on employment have in large part had a harmful 
effect on unauthorized alien employees and their employers.  A total of twelve state enactments in 
2007 either prohibited employers from employing aliens unauthorized for work under federal 
standards, limited tax right-offs where illegal aliens are employed, eliminated the award of 
unemployment compensation to illegal aliens, or conditioned the award of public subsidies on an 
employee’s lawful immigrant status.4  
 Most prominent among recently enacted state or local laws are the Legal Arizona Workers Act5 
(‘Arizona Act’) and the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance6 (‘Hazleton Ordinance’), the latter 
being promulgated by the municipality of Hazleton in northeastern Pennsylvania.  These enactments 
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have several similarities: both were promulgated pursuant to a savings clause in the federal 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,7 and both enactments purport to revoke the business 
license of an employer who hires an immigrant worker with knowledge that the immigrant is not 
authorized for employment in the United States.8  Additionally, both the Arizona Act and the 
Hazleton Ordinance were challenged in federal court as an unconstitutional regulation of 
immigration and preempted by federal law.9   
 Specifically, in Arizona Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria, private employers sued to enjoin the 
enforcement of the Arizona Act, arguing the Arizona Act is both an impermissible regulation of 
immigration and it is preempted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).10  Similarly, 
in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, private employers sued to enjoin enforcement of the Hazleton 
Ordinance, arguing that it too was an impermissible regulation of immigration and preempted by 
federal law (again, the IRCA).  Despite the similarities between the Arizona Act and the Hazleton 
Ordinance, however, the presiding federal district judges in Arizona Contractors and Lozano arrived 
at differing conclusions as to the preemptive scope of the IRCA.  It is the purpose of this article to 
survey the reasoning in Arizona Contractors and Lozano for congruence with Supreme Court 
preemption jurisprudence.11
 In Part I of this paper, I will describe the development of the Supreme Court’s modern 
preemption jurisprudence.  In Part II, I will describe the Supreme Court’s preemption analysis of 
state laws affecting immigration in the seminal 1976 decision DeCanas v. Bica.12  Before 
proceeding with a discussion of the recent decisions in Arizona Contractors and Lozano, in Part III, I 
will briefly survey the relevant provisions of the federal IRCA.  In Part IV examines the provisions 
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of the Arizona Act and Hazleton Ordinance, followed by a discussion of Arizona Contractors and 
Lozano in Part V.13   
I.  FEDERAL SUPREMACY AND THE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 
 It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework that a state statute yields to its federal 
counterpart when the state law interferes with the “accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of an Act of Congress.”14  The subordination of state and local law to a 
statute lawfully enacted by Congress is a direct application of the Supremacy Clause of the federal 
Constitution.15  Worded somewhat differently, the preemption of state law reflects the states’ 
relinquishment of authority over those matters ceded to the Congress in Article I of the Constitution.  
 Beginning in the 1930’s, the Supreme Court dealt with preemption challenges to state laws with 
a restrained hand, often forgiving minor conflicts between state and federal law in order to 
accommodate an arguably important state interest.16  For example, in Mintz v. Baldwin, the Supreme 
Court upheld a New York law which limited the importation of out-of-state beef based on fears of 
disease, even where the federal Cattle Contagious Disease Act permitted the interstate transport of 
the very same livestock.17  In Mintz, the Court noted “the purpose of Congress to supersede or 
exclude state action against the ravages of [] disease is not lightly to be inferred.  The intention to do 
so must definitely and clearly appear.”18  According to one commentator, Mintz “marked a renewed 
recognition of state power,” recognizing a “presumption against preemption” in areas of “intimate 
concern” to states.19   Others have opined that Mintz was part of an evolving concept of preemption 
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to avoid the preemption of vast areas of state regulation in the face of expansive Commerce Clause 
legislation.20   
 Additionally, in H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, a New Hampshire law was challenged as 
being preempted by the federal Motor Carrier Act.21  The Supreme Court upheld the New 
Hampshire law, which limited the driving day of a commercial motorist to no more than 12 hours, 
despite the federal Motor Carrier Act delegating such regulatory authority to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.22  The Court in H.P. Welch articulated a preference for a clearly manifested 
preemptive reach, noting: 
In construing federal statutes . . . it should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or suspend the 
exercise of the reserved powers of a state, even where it may be done, unless, and except so far as, its purpose 
to do so is clearly manifested.23
 In Hines v. Davidowitz, however, the Court signaled a departure from a prevailing sense of 
accommodation toward state interests.24  The issue in Hines was whether a state’s Alien Registration 
Act was preempted by a subsequent federal act of the same name.25  The Court declined to recognize 
the importance of the state interest, and instead it adopted a presumption of preemption because “the 
regulation of aliens” belongs to a “class of laws which concern the exterior relation of this whole 
nation with other nations and governments.”26     
 Hines also opened the door to a series of decisions embodying a judicial preference in favor of 
federal control, particularly in cases dealing with interstate commerce, labor relations, banking, and 
aviation.27  The gradual end of a “presumption against preemption”28 in Mintz and H.P. Welch was 
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forcefully noted by Chief Justice Warren in Free v. Bland, stating that “the relative importance to the 
State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with federal law.”29   
 Commentators have noted that the development of preemption case law since Hines has varied 
depending on the composition of the Court. For example, the Warren Court embodied a strong 
preference for federal regulation, the Burger Court was increasingly tolerant of complementary state 
regulation, and the Rehnquist court had an inconsistent approach toward preemption with a distinctly 
pro-business stance.30  Throughout its compositional evolution since Hines, however, the Court has 
maintained a subject matter a presumption against preemption where “federal law is said to bar state 
action in fields of traditional state regulation.”31  At the opposite end, “an ‘assumption’ of non-
preemption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of 
significant federal presence.”32
 Additionally, over time the Court has structured preemption into two distinct categories: express 
preemption and implied preemption.  Express preemption is said to occur where there is “language 
in the federal statute that reveals an explicit congressional intent to pre-empt state law.”33  In the 
absence of express preemption, the question of preemption requires a consideration of whether 
Congress has somehow impliedly precluded the state or local enactment in question.  Implied 
preemption may be achieved where (i) a federal statute creates a scheme of regulation “so pervasive 
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it;”34 (ii) 
compliance with both the state and federal statute is a physical impossibility;35 or (iii) where the 
state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”36
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 In view of the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence, the application of preemption 
principles to the Arizona Act or Hazleton Ordinance, as current examples, depend on how the Court 
characterizes the underlying state enactment.37  Additionally, the application of preemption 
principles to the Arizona Act or Hazleton Ordinance also requires an understanding of the federal 
Immigration Reform and Control Act.  
 For a more detailed analysis of preemption principles and immigration, we turn to a discussion 
of the 1976 decision of the Supreme Court in DeCanas v. Bica.   
II.  PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES AND STATE OR LOCAL ‘IMMIGRATION’ LAW 
 The Burger Court in DeCanas addressed for the first time the extent to which a state’s labor 
regulations are constitutional38 though they in some way affect immigrants.39  At issue was a 
California labor law that made it unlawful to “knowingly employ an alien who is not entitled to 
lawful residence in the United States.”40  An employer found to have violated this statute could be 
subject to criminal sanctions, and the statute also created a civil cause of action against the 
employer.41   
 The plaintiffs in DeCanas were lawful migrant farmworkers who brought a private action 
against their employer, as authorized under the California law in question.42  The farmworkers 
alleged they were denied “continued employment due to a surplus in labor resulting from the 
defendants’ knowing employment of illegal aliens.”43  The California trial court dismissed the 
complaint, holding the California law unconstitutional as an impermissible regulation of 
immigration.44  The California Court of Appeal affirmed.45   
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 Relying on Hines, the California Court of Appeal held that the California law was an “attempt 
to regulate the conditions for admission of foreign nationals,”46 and therefore unconstitutional 
because “in the area of immigration and naturalization, congressional power is exclusive.”47  The 
Court of Appeal additionally indicated that state regulation over this subject matter was preempted 
when “Congress ‘as an incident of national sovereignty’ enacted the [Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952] as a comprehensive scheme covering all aspects of immigration and naturalization, 
including the employment of aliens.”48
 However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this holding and reversed the decision of the 
California Court of Appeal.49  Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Brennan began with the 
proposition that “the Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with 
aliens is a regulation of immigration” and thus per se unconstitutional.50  He characterized the 
California law as having a “purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration.”51  Justice 
Brennan also emphasized that a state regulation of aliens was not ipso facto a regulation of 
immigration:  
[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is 
essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under 
which a legal entrant may remain.52
After holding that the California statute was not a regulation of immigration, the focus of the court’s 
opinion in DeCanas turned to one of preemption in light of the federal Immigration and Nationality 
Act.  
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  Justice Brennan articulated two means by which state and local enactments affecting 
immigrants would be preempted by federal law.53  First, a state or local law may be preempted by a 
demonstration that it was the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” to effect a complete ouster of 
state power in a given field.54  In order to achieve this form of preemption – preemption by 
occupation of the field – Brennan suggested a need for references in the statutory language of the 
federal law or its legislative history for some indication of Congressional intent to “preclude even 
harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal aliens in 
particular.”55    
 Second, Justice Brennan explained that a state or local enactment “touching on aliens” would be 
preempted where it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress,” or stands as an actual conflict to federal law – both forms of implied 
conflict preemption.56  Without deciding whether the California law was in conflict with the INA, 
the court suggested that the California law would conflict if it penalized the employment of aliens 
who were otherwise permitted to work under federal standards.57  
 In view of DeCanas, which affirmed the application of the Supreme Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence in the realm of immigration law,58 a state or local enactment touching on aliens is 
unconstitutional if any of the following are true: (i) the state or local enactment is a regulation of 
immigration, that is, a limitation on who may enter the United States and the terms upon which an 
alien may remain;59 (ii) Congress has expressly preempted the state or local enactment at issue;60 
(iii) Congress intended a complete ouster of state and local regulation in a given field;61 or (iv) 
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where it is either impossible to comply with the federal statute and the local enactment or where the 
local enactment impedes the achievement of some federal objective.62  
 The principles in DeCanas survive today in their current form,63 but they have never been 
applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate an immigrant-affecting state or local enactment under a 
theory of federal preemption.64  Since 1976, however, Congress has extensively regulated the 
employment relationship in the immigration context with the passage of the Immigrant Reform and 
Control Act of 1986.65   Before we turn to a DeCanas preemption analysis of the recent Arizona and 
Hazleton enactments, and because the question of preemption is necessarily a question of statutory 
interpretation, we briefly discuss the relevant provisions and legislative history of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act.66  
III.  IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT 
 A. Employment Verification System  
 Prior to 1986, the Supreme Court in De Canas had ruled that the federal Immigration and 
Nationality Act did not preempt state or local measures that impose civil or even criminal sanctions 
on employers of undocumented aliens.67  At that time, at least twelve states had sanctions in place 
for employers who knowingly employed aliens contrary to federal standards.68  In 1986, however, as 
part of a broader package of immigration reform, Congress created a system of federal sanctions for 
employers of unauthorized aliens in the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).69   
 The IRCA mandates a federal system whereby employers are required to verify an employee’s 
authorization to work, or face the risk of civil and criminal penalties.70  Specifically, the IRCA 
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stipulates that it is unlawful for an employer “to hire . . . for employment in the United States an 
alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien [] with respect to such employment.”71  An 
“unauthorized alien” is defined by the IRCA as an alien not “lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence” or “authorized to be so employed by [the IRCA] or by the Attorney General.”72  
Congress required every covered employer to verify each prospective employee is not an 
“unauthorized alien” by examining documents tendered by the prospective employee.73  The 
employer is permitted to accept a U.S. passport or a resident alien card as proof of identification and 
employment eligibility.74  In the absence of these documents, an employer may instead accept a 
“social security account number card” in conjunction with a “driver’s license or similar document 
issued for purposes of identification by a State.”75  The employer is not required to verify the 
authenticity of documents tendered, but must merely make a good faith effort at compliance.76  The 
employer is required to retain a copy of these documents for a period of time, to be made available 
upon request by officials of the Department of Labor or the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Service .77  
 Employers who find themselves in violation of these provisions are subject to civil penalties of 
as much as $2000 per violation.78  Additionally, an employer found to have engaged in a pattern of 
violations may be subject to a criminal fine of up to $3000 and imprisonment for up to six months 
for each violation.79  An administrative law judge has authority to adjudicate whether an employer 
knowingly employed an ‘unauthorized’ alien, and any such decision is subject to judicial review.80   
 The Supreme Court has on repeated occasions acknowledged that the IRCA is a 
“comprehensive [federal] scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States” 
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that resulted in a “legal landscape now significantly changed.”81  Adding to this changed landscape, 
Congress in 1990 amended the IRCA to provide for sanctions to be imposed directly on 
undocumented workers who seek employment in the United States.82  Currently,   
it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United States without some party 
directly contravening explicit congressional policies. Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent 
identification, which subverts the cornerstone of IRCA’s enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly 
hires the undocumented alien in direct contravention of its IRCA obligations.83
  B. Express Preemption and Savings Clause: Legislative History 
  A key component of the Immigration Reform and Control Act is its express preemption and 
savings clause, providing:  
The provisions of [the IRCA] preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than 
through licensing or similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, 
unauthorized aliens.84
In 1985, the Senate Judiciary Committee included this savings clause in a bill that would later be 
enacted as the IRCA.85  The Senate bill left committee without any reference to the savings clause in 
the committee report, however.86   The Senate version would pass on September 19, 1985.87
  The House of Representatives later adopted the Senate bill, and included four House Committee 
Reports, only one of which commented on the preemption and savings clause.88 That report (“House 
Report”), from the House Judiciary Committee, stated: 
The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to specifically preempt any state or local laws providing 
civil fines and / or criminal sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or referral of undocumented aliens.   They are 
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not intended to preempt or prevent lawful state or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation or 
refusal to reissue a license to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in this 
legislation.  Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or “fitness to do business laws,” such 
as state farm labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which specifically require such licensee or contractor to 
refrain from hiring, recruiting or referring undocumented aliens.89
The joint conference committee report, however, was silent as to preemption.90
  C.  E-Verify Pilot Program 
  Despite the comprehensive nature of the IRCA verification system, it is one that has been 
thoroughly defeated through identity theft and fraud.91  In anticipation of a need for improvement of 
the IRCA verification system, Congress in 1986 authorized the evaluation and improvement of 
employment verification systems: 
To the extent that the [employment eligibility verification] system . . . is found to not be a secure system to 
determine eligibility in the Unites States, the President shall . . . implement such changes . . . as may be 
necessary to establish a secure system to determine employment eligibility in the United States.92  
No meaningful improvements were instituted to the verification system, however, until the 104th 
Congress in 1996 required the Attorney General to conduct three pilot programs to improve the 
employment verification system.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) specified that “any person or entity that conducts any hiring (or recruitment or referral) in 
a State in which a [federal] pilot program is operating may elect to participate in that pilot 
program.”93  At the same time, the Attorney General was prohibited from requiring any employer 
from participating in the federal pilot program.94  
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 Pursuant to IIRIRA, the U.S. Attorney General in 1997 instituted the “Basic Pilot/Employment 
Eligibility Verification Program,” along with two other pilot programs aimed at improving 
employment verification.95 The Basic Pilot Program is a voluntary employment eligibility program 
administered by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) in partnership with the 
Social Security Administration (SSA).96  The Basic Pilot Program, more commonly known as E-
Verify,97 has grown into an internet-based system that verifies the employment eligibility of newly 
hired employees based on the social security number provided to the employer:  
 When the [E-Verify] system provides a tentative nonconfirmation, the employee has an opportunity to contact 
SSA or USCIS, using instructions provided by the employer, to clear up his records.  If the employee is 
successful, the E-Verify databases are updated.  If the employee fails to contest the nonfirmation or is 
unsuccessful in doing so, E-Verify issues a final nonconfirmation to the employer, who must then terminate the 
employee or face a presumption that it violated the IRCA.98
 Several state legislatures have mandated the use of E-Verify to ensure newly hired state 
employees or contractors are authorized for employment under federal standards.99  For example, 
Colorado, Arkansas and West Virginia enacted legislation in 2007 requiring state employers to 
verify the employment eligibility of contractors in connection with public contracts for services.100  
Arizona requires both state and private employers to verify employee eligibility using E-Verify.101 
As of this writing, the South Carolina legislature is considering legislation requiring both state and 
private employers to verify employment status using E-Verify.102  Additionally, at least one 
municipality – Halzeton – has required the use of E-Verify to ensure newly hired employees are 
authorized for employment.103   
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IV. THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT AND THE HAZLETON ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT 
ORDINANCE 
 
 As was mentioned earlier, the Arizona legislature enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act 
within the permissive grant of authority contained in the IRCA’s preemption savings clause.104  The 
Act provides that “an employer shall not intentionally employ an unauthorized alien or knowingly 
employ an unauthorized alien.”105  It further commands that “every employer, after hiring an 
employee, shall verify the employment eligibility of the employee through the basic pilot 
program.”106   
 The Act imposes no fines or criminal sanctions for violating these provisions.  Rather, an 
employer found by a state superior court to have knowingly employed an unauthorized alien, 
contrary to federal guidelines, is subject to a three year probationary period.107  Any further 
violations within that probationary period can result in the revocation of “all licenses that are held by 
the employer and that are necessary to operate the employer’s business at the employer’s business 
location where the unauthorized alien performed work.”108  This is limited, of course, to those 
licenses granted by the State of Arizona or its political subdivisions.109   
 The use of the E-Verify system operates as an affirmative defense to an employer found to have 
hired an unauthorized worker.110  Additionally, in an effort to curtail false and harassing reports, the 
Act makes it a misdemeanor to “knowingly file[] a false and frivolous complaint.”111  
 The Hazleton Ordinance, by comparison, is more ambitious, in that it also includes a prohibition 
on renting housing to illegal aliens.112  Limiting ourselves to the portion pertaining to employment, 
the Ordinance states as follows: 
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It is unlawful for any business entity to recruit, hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit, 
dispatch, or instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to perform work in whole or in part within the 
City.113
The Ordinance defines “unlawful worker” as “a person who does not have the legal right or 
authorization to work due to an impediment in any provision of federal, state or local law.”114 A 
violation of the employment provisions of the Hazleton Ordinance can result in the temporary 
suspension of a business permit previously granted to the employer.115  Employers are exempt from 
the penalties of the Ordinance if, prior to the date of the violation, the employer “verified the work 
authorization of the alleged unlawful worker(s) using the Basic Pilot Program.”116   
  The Ordinance also requires “all agencies of the City to participate in the Basic Pilot 
Program.”117 Additionally, the Ordinance stipulates that city contracts may not be awarded to 
employers who fail to “provide documentation confirming its enrollment and participation in the 
Basic Pilot Program.”118  
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: ARIZONA CONTRACTORS AND LOZANO 
 In response to the July 2, 2007 enactment of the Legal Arizona Workers Act, several non-profit 
organizations brought a legal challenge to the validity of the Arizona enactment in Arizona 
Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria.119  Eight months earlier, employers and lawful immigrants in 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania filed suit to enjoin the enforcement of the Hazleton Ordinance in Lozano v. 
City of Hazleton.120  Both enactments were challenged as an unconstitutional regulation of 
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immigration and, alternatively, preempted by the IRCA.  Each allegation, and each court’s 
conclusion, is discussed herein.  
       A. Unconstitutional Regulation of Immigration  
 The Supreme Court in DeCanas reiterated the axiomatic point that the “power to regulate 
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”121  However, as explained in DeCanas, 
not every state or local enactment “which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of 
immigration.”122  The Burger Court in DeCanas narrowly interpreted “regulation of immigration” to 
mean those regulations that determine “who should or should not be admitted into the country, and 
the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”123
 In Arizona Contractors and Lozano, both district courts concluded that the state and local 
enactments in question were not unconstitutional regulations of immigration.124  The district court in 
Arizona Contractors explained that the Arizona statute is comparable to the California statute in 
DeCanas, in that both the Arizona statute and the California statute in DeCanas “adopt federal 
standards in imposing . . . sanctions against state employers who knowingly employ aliens who have 
no federal right to employment within the country.”125  Specifically, the Arizona legislature adopted 
the federal government’s classification of aliens, borrowing from the definition of “unauthorized 
alien” in the IRCA.126  Additionally, the district court in Arizona Contractors observed that the 
Arizona statute “regulate[s] only licensing and employment,”127 and not “who should or should not 
be admitted into the country, [or] the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”128  
  - 17 -
 Similarly, the Lozano court concluded that the Hazleton Ordinance was not an unconstitutional 
regulation of immigration.129  Succinctly stating its conclusion in a footnote, the Lozano court 
concluded that the Hazleton Ordinance “do[es] not regulate who can or cannot be admitted to the 
country or the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”130  This signifies the only point 
of agreement between the decisions in Arizona Contractors and Lozano.  
B.  Express Preemption Under the IRCA 
The provisions of this section [8 U.S.C. § 1324a] preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for 
employment, unauthorized aliens.131
 The plaintiffs in Arizona Contractors next challenged the Arizona Act as being expressly 
preempted by the IRCA’s preemption clause.132  Plaintiffs’ counsel argued for a narrow 
interpretation of the savings clause language – “licensing and similar laws” – thereby excluding the 
Arizona Act from the savings clause.133 Similarly, the plaintiffs in Lozano challenged the Hazleton 
Ordinance as being expressly preempted by the IRCA.134  The Lozano plaintiffs argued that the 
IRCA’s savings clause was limited to a specific type of licensing law, to the exclusion of laws and 
ordinances of the kind employed by the city of Hazleton.135  
 In addressing this argument, the district court in Arizona Contractors acknowledged that the 
IRCA does not define “license” or “licensing laws.”136  The district court proceeded with a 
dictionary definition: “permission, usually revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be 
unlawful.”137  It determined that the Arizona Act constitutes a “licensing law” because the Arizona 
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Act “sets out criteria and a process to suspend or revoke a permission to do business in the state.”138 
 Because “[t]he Act’s definition of a license does not depart from common sense or traditional 
understandings of what is a license,” the court in Arizona Contractors concluded that the Arizona 
Act “falls within the plain meaning of the IRCA’s savings clause.”139 Thus, the court did not find 
express preemption of the Arizona Act; to the contrary, it found that the IRCA expressly authorizes 
the Arizona Act.140  
 Additionally, the district court in Arizona Contractors acknowledged the disproportionate 
severity of rescinding a business license when compared to other civil sanctions administered by the 
federal government under the IRCA.141  The district court addressed this disparity, reasoning “[i]f 
the authorized state and federal sanctions are disproportional in severity, that is because Congress 
recognized the disproportional harm to core state and federal responsibilities from unauthorized 
alien labor.”142
 By contrast, the district court in Lozano determined the IRCA expressly preempted the Hazleton 
Ordinance.143  The court in Lozano arrived at a narrow definition of “licensing and similar laws.”144 
 In support of its conclusion, the district court assumed the revocation of a business license was the 
“ultimate sanction,” at least when compared to civil and criminal fines.145  By this understanding, it 
would strain reason for Congress to allow states to provide the ‘ultimate sanction,’ but not a lesser 
penalty.146  Thus, the Lozano court construed “licensing and similar laws” to exclude those licensing 
laws that threaten to revoke business licenses.147  
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 The Lozano court also offered a narrowed interpretation of “licensing and similar laws” by 
relying on text of the following House Report, which made reference to the preemption clause in the 
IRCA:  
The penalties contained in this legislation are intended to specifically preempt any state or local laws providing 
civil fines and/or criminal sanctions on the hiring, recruitment or referral of undocumented aliens.  They are not 
intended to preempt or prevent lawful state or local processes concerning the suspension, revocation, or refusal 
to reissue a license to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions in this 
legislation [the IRCA].148
According to the district court’s interpretation of this House Report, “licensing or similar laws” are 
those laws that sanction employers who have violated the IRCA – not those employers who have 
violated some other ordinance.149  Because the Hazleton Ordinance is a law that “suspends the 
business permit of those who violate its Ordinance, not those who violate the IRCA,” the district 
court reasoned the Hazleton Ordinance is not a “licensing [or] similar law.”150   
  Additionally, the House Report recited forestry and labor laws as among those that are not 
preempted: 
Further, the Committee does not intend to preempt licensing or “fitness to do business laws,” such as state farm 
labor contractor laws or forestry laws, which specifically require such licensee or contractor to refrain from 
hiring, recruiting or referring undocumented aliens.151
From the foregoing quote, the Lozano court determined that “licensing and similar laws” may also 
include farm labor contractor laws and forestry laws.152  Quite clearly, the Hazleton Ordinance is not 
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a “state farm labor contractor law or forestry law,” and this exception to preemption does not 
apply.153   
  In sum, the district court in Lozano interpreted the savings clause to “save” from the preemptive 
reach of the IRCA (i) forestry and farm labor contractor laws and (ii) any other state or local law that 
does not disproportionately punish employers with the ‘ultimate sanction’ (revoking a business 
license), provided the state or local law does not punish employers for any violations of law other 
than the IRCA.154  Because the Hazleton Ordinance did not fit the district court’s construction of 
“licensing and similar laws,” it was expressly preempted by the IRCA.155  
  Here, as the reader might appreciate, the Lozano court and Arizona Contractors court differed 
sharply in their understanding of the IRCA preemption savings clause.  The Lozano court favored a 
narrow construction of the savings clause, while the Arizona Contractors court adhered to a ‘plain 
language’ interpretation of “licensing and similar laws.”156  Both opinions acknowledge that a ‘plain 
language’ interpretation of “licensing and similar laws” may result in a disproportionally severe state 
penalty (revocation of a business license) when compared to a federal sanction (civil or criminal 
fines).157  Yet only the Lozano court was persuaded that this disparity required a narrowing 
interpretation of “licensing and other laws.”158   
  Additionally, the Lozano and Arizona Contractors courts differed in their treatment of the 
House Report.159  The Lozano court interpreted the House Report to limit the meaning of “licensing 
and other laws” to farm labor and forestry laws, and those licensing laws punishing violations of the 
federal IRCA.160  The Arizona Contractors court, by contrast, did not share this interpretation.  The 
Arizona Contractors court construed the House Report as merely giving examples of “licensing or 
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similar laws” that are saved from the preemptive reach of the IRCA.161  It found no support in the 
House Report for the notion that the “example given in [the House Report] exhausts the entire 
meaning of the licensing sanction authorization.”162
  C. Implied Conflict Preemption  
  In the absence of express preemption, implied conflict preemption exists where “compliance 
with both State and federal law is impossible, or when the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”163  In both Arizona 
Contractors and Lozano, the district courts proceeded with an analysis of implied conflict 
preemption – undoubtedly to guard against reversal on appeal and “for purposes of completeness”164 
and “thoroughness.”165  Moreover, the Supreme Court has on multiple occasions suggested that 
implied preemption might exist despite the presence of an express preemption clause – though the 
presumption is that “Congress did not intend to preempt other matters.”166  Thus, it is provident to 
consider an implied preemption analysis of the Arizona Act and Hazleton Ordinance consistent with 
the teachings of DeCanas. 
  In Arizona Contractors, the district court looked to comparable language of the Arizona Act and 
the IRCA in determining whether there is a conflict between the Arizona Act and the IRCA.167  It 
noted that both acts share the same scienter requirement, in that the “[Arizona] Act and the IRCA 
prohibit employers from ‘knowingly’ employing an unauthorized alien.”168  It also noted that both 
the IRCA and the Arizona Act contain procedures “for weeding out frivolous complaints,”169 and 
both laws afford an affirmative defense to “employers who have ‘complied in good faith’” with the 
requirements of the IRCA.170  In light of these similarities, the Arizona Contractors court noted the 
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Arizona Act’s “employer sanctions provisions . . . mirror those of the IRCA in every significant 
respect. They do not conflict with the purposes and objectives of Congress.”171
  The district court in Lozano, by contrast, identified at least three conflicts between the Hazleton 
Ordinance and the IRCA: (i) “under federal law, the employer has the responsibility to review the 
documents, and in the Hazleton Ordinance, the employer is required to present the documents to the 
Code Enforcement Office for verification of eligibility [using E-Verify];”172 (ii)  the Hazleton 
Ordinance provides a civil cause of action for lawful workers terminated by employers of unlawful 
employees173 (similar to the California law at issue in DeCanas), while the IRCA does not; and (iii) 
the Hazleton Ordinance requires mandatory use of E-Verify (through the City Code Enforcement 
Office), whereas the IRCA provides for the voluntary use of E-Verify.174  
  Additionally, the Lozano court characterized the Hazleton Ordinance and the IRCA as 
“strik[ing] a different balance” with regard to the burdens on employers and the goal of preventing 
the employment of unauthorized persons.175 In explaining the effect of a “different balance,” the 
court stated: 
IRCA and [the Hazleton Ordinance] share a similar purpose: to prevent the employment of persons not 
authorized to work in the United States while not overburdening the employer in determining whether an 
employee or perspective [sic] employee is an authorized worker. The two laws, however, strike a different 
balance between these interests. The laws, therefore, conflict.176
  In sum, the Lozano court reasoned that the Hazleton Ordinance was in actual conflict with the 
IRCA on at least three levels, and that the Ordinance “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’” because it adopts a different balance 
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of interests.177  By contrast, the Arizona Contractors court did not perceive either an actual conflict 
between the Arizona Act and the IRCA, or a conflict with the purposes and objectives behind the 
IRCA.178   
  To the extent that the Arizona Act and the Hazleton Ordinance differ, we need not expect the 
same outcome for both the Arizona Act and the Hazleton Ordinance in an implied conflict 
preemption analysis.179  Here, the Arizona Act and the Hazleton Ordinance are different in one 
meaningful respect: only the Hazleton Ordinance provides for a private right of action.180 The 
Hazleton Ordinance, as mentioned above, provides a cause of action to a discharged employee 
against his former employer, provided the former employer employed unauthorized workers in 
contravention of federal work authorization standards.181  The Ordinance does not stipulate a 
scienter requirement in the cause of action; that is, a cause of action may be brought against an 
employer who unknowingly and in good faith employed an unauthorized worker.182 Under the 
Arizona Act, by contrast, the county attorney is required to initiate a hearing before a state superior 
court to determine if the employer, as alleged, has knowingly employed unauthorized workers. 183
  In light of this difference between the Arizona Act and the Hazleton Ordinance, it is possible 
that the implied conflict preemption analysis in both Arizona Contractors and the Lozano are 
consistent with DeCanas. The Supreme Court in DeCanas Court remanded to the district court the 
question of implied conflict preemption, suggesting in dicta that if the California law penalized the 
employment of aliens who were otherwise permitted to work under federal standards, it would 
conflict with federal law.184  Here, to the extent that the Hazleton Ordinance provides a private right 
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of action against employers who are merely negligent in hiring an unauthorized worker, the 
Ordinance penalizes employers who are not otherwise violating the IRCA.185  
  Therefore, to the extent that the Hazleton Ordinance penalizes individuals and conduct that 
Congress has exempted or excluded from federal sanctions, the Lozano court was consistent with 
DeCanas in finding the Ordinance to be preempted by the IRCA as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of Congress’ full purpose and objectives underlying the IRCA.186  
But because the Arizona Act differs by not introducing a private right of action against employers of 
unauthorized workers, the district court in Arizona Contractors was correct to conclude there was no 
finding of implied conflict preemption.187  
       D. Preemption by Occupation of the Field 
 From DeCanas, even absent a conflict, a state law must yield to a federal law where Congress 
intended the federal law to “occupy the field.”188  “Only a demonstration that complete ouster of 
state power –including state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws – was ‘the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ would justify this conclusion.”189  References in the 
statutory language or the legislative history may demonstrate some indication of Congressional 
intent to “preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general, or the 
employment of illegal aliens in particular.”190   
  In Arizona Contractors, the district court construed the Arizona Act’s statutory authority to 
revoke a business license as a component of the state’s police power, and “within the mainstream of 
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such police power regulation.”191  The district court relied on DeCanas to formulate a presumption 
against preemption of state law:  
[where] federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation, . . .  [courts proceed] on the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not . . . superseded by the [IRCA] unless that was 
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.192   
In view of the demanding showing required, it is perhaps no surprise that the plaintiffs were unable 
to illustrate that “Congress impliedly so cabined the states’ residual police powers in [an] area of 
great and pervasive local import.”193  The Arizona Contractors court therefore concluded that the 
IRCA did not preempt the Arizona Act by occupation of the field.194
  By contrast, the district court in Lozano relied on Hoffman Plastic Compounds (which was not a 
preemption decision) to create a presumption in favor of preemption.195  The Supreme Court in 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds characterized the IRCA as a “comprehensive scheme prohibiting the 
employment of illegal aliens in the United States,” through which Congress “‘forcefully’ made 
combating the employment of illegal aliens central to the ‘policy of immigration law.’”196  This 
statement buttressed the conclusion in Lozano that the IRCA preempted, by occupation of the field, 
all state and local laws relating to “the employment of unauthorized aliens.”197  After thoroughly 
reiterating the federal government’s interest in immigration and noting the comprehensive nature of 
the IRCA, the Lozano court concluded the IRCA “leaves no room for state regulation,” and thus 
preempts the entire field of state law touching on the employment of illegal aliens.198   
 In view of the diverging conclusions in Arizona Contractors and Lozano, one might inquire if 
either opinion ‘correctly’ determined the extent to which the IRCA preempts state and local laws by 
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occupation of the field.  However, in light of uncertainty surrounding the preemptive scope of the 
IRCA, both conclusions are arguably reasonable interpretations of the IRCA.  Commentators and 
jurists have complained of the existing uncertainty surrounding the extent to which the IRCA 
displaces state and local law by occupation of the field; some calling for “a more extensive review of 
the Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence to fully understand the relationship between 
federal immigration policy and state labor and employment law in the IRCA preemption context.”199 
 One commentator noted that “although the Supreme Court has held that the IRCA is a 
comprehensive scheme to combat the employment of undocumented aliens [in Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds], subsequent lower court decisions have found [the] IRCA not so comprehensive as to 
prevent undocumented aliens from receiving state unemployment benefits.”200  It is arguably smarter 
social policy if the IRCA does not completely displace the field of state employment laws regulating 
alien employment, for fear that state laws that provide employment benefits and medical benefits to 
aliens, such as back pay and workers’ compensation, could be preempted by the IRCA.201  
CONCLUSION 
 In view of the recent explosion of state and local lawmaking touching on the employment of 
unauthorized immigrant workers, Arizona Contractors and Lozano are prominent examples of future 
legal challenges to laws which make mandatory the use of the federal E-Verify program.  Parties in 
both lawsuits have filed notices of appeal, and as of this writing, a third state, South Carolina, is 
considering similar mandatory use of E-Verify – a further example of state lawmaking 
commensurate with Congressional silence on immigration reform. 
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  As undesirable as these state and local laws may be however, an understanding of preemption 
principles will likely enable state and local lawmakers to draft statutes that successfully navigate the 
strictures of DeCanas.  As long as DeCanas remains good law, some degree of state and local 
lawmaking affecting immigrants is permissible.  In the present, Arizona’s initial success in Arizona 
Contractors is at least encouraging to those legislators who would seize upon the freedoms in the 
IRCA preemption savings clause.  Lozano, by contrast, is perhaps best understood as a facial 
challenge to an ordinance plainly hostile to immigrants, adjudicated by a court equally resentful of 
the nefarious efforts of the Hazleton City Council.   
 Together, Lozano and Arizona Contractors are valuable illustrations of the scrutinizing review 
awaiting state and local laws that purport to require private employers to participate in E-Verify.  To 
the extent that state and local legislation can rigidly adhere to the federal standards of the IRCA, 
courts may be more willing to view such state or local laws as a complementary regulation of 
employment well within the mainstream of state police powers.  However, as state and local 
enactments grow more extravagant with added restrictions and sanctions, the state or local 
enactment in question is increasingly likely to be deemed preempted by the IRCA.  
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83 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 148. 
84 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 
85 S. 1200, 99th Cong. (1985). 
86 See Senate Judiciary Report on S. 1200 (Aug. 25, 1985). 
87 S. Rep. No. 99-132 (1985). Prior to 1976, federal immigration bills calling for employer sanctions did not contain 
a preemption clause.  Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (“After the DeCanas decision, 
Congressional bills calling for federal employer sanctions began containing preemption clauses for the first time.  
None passed.  In following session of Congress, bills were introduced that included preemption clauses similar to 
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those of the 95th Congress.  Again, none passed.” (internal citations omitted)). 
88 S. 1200 was passed by voice vote in the House of Representatives on Oct. 9, 1986.  
89 H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662.  
90 H. Conf. Rep. No. 99-1000 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5480. For whatever prominence the House 
Report might have in a dispute centering on the IRCA, the Supreme Court indicated its disfavor in Hoffman Plastic, 
relegating treatment of the House Report to a footnote and noting the varied interpretations of what the report 
purports to even say. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 149 n.4.   
91 “No commentator on immigration policy -- not academics, not immigrant advocates, not the Bush administration, 
not the enforcement-only enthusiasts . . . claims that employer sanctions have been effective.”  Schuck, supra note 
11, at 78.  See also Jonathon Peterson, INS Penalty System Falls Down on Job, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001 
(“Employer sanctions were undermined by a booming market in phony documents, the needs of employers to fill 
their job openings, widespread resistance to the creation of a national identification card – and by politics.”); see also 
Robert Suro, Traffic in Fake Documents Is Blamed for New Rise in Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1990, 
at A14.  
92 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(d). 
93 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 Stat. 
3009, 3009-655 to 3009-665 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (emphasis added).  
94 Id.  
95 Department of Homeland Security E-Verify Fact Sheet [hereinafter E-Verify Fact Sheet], available at 
http://www.smartbusinesspractices .com/legal_everifyfaq.php.  
96 Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, 117 Stat. 1944 (2003) (note 
following 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).  To oversimplify, the INS was restructured in 2003 as the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service (USCIS), Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Agency.  E-Verify remains a partnership between the Social Security Administration and USCIS.  
97 E-Verify Fact Sheet, supra note 78.  According to the Department of Homeland Security, 19,000 employers 
enrolled as of August 9, 2007, with an estimated 1000 new employers enrolling each month. Id. The Department of 
Homeland Security’s 2009 Proposed Budget would expand E-Verify and allocate $100 million to “continue the 
expansion and enhancements for the Internet-based system.” Department of Homeland Security, Budget for Fiscal 
Year 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/pdf/budget/dhs.pdf. 
98 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.  
99 In other words, at least four states (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado and West Virginia) require state hiring offices to 
verify the employment eligibility of job applicants using E-Verify.  
100 ARK. CODE  ANN. § 19-11-105 (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-17.5-102(1), (2)(b)(I) (2007); W. VA. CODE § 21-
1B-2 et seq. (2007).  One state actually prohibits the utilization of E-Verify by both public and private employers.  
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/12 (2007).  This law was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2008, but the Illinois 
Attorney General agreed to stay enforcement pending the outcome of a suit by the Justice Department to 
permanently enjoin enforcement of this law. 
101 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(I).   
102 Forbes.com, S.C. Lawmakers Weigh Immigration Reform, Apr. 3, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2008/04/03/ afx4850839.html. 
103 Ordinance 2006-18, supra note , § 4..  The IIRA Ordinance was originally enacted on July 13, 2006. See 
McKanders, supra note 11, at 3. 
104 See Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.  
105 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A). Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (“It is unlawful for a person or other entity 
– (A) to hire, or recruit for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized 
alien . . . with respect to such employment.”). 
106 Id. § 23-214.  
107 Id. § 23-212(F)(1)(b). 
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108 Id. § 23-212-F.1(c). 
109 Id. § 23-211-7. A “license” means “any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter or similar form 
of authorization that is required by law and that is issued by any agency for the purposes of operating a business in 
this state.”  It expressly includes articles of incorporation, a certificate of partnership, and it excludes professional 
licenses.  
110 Id. § 23-212(F)(1)(b). 
111 Id. § 23-212(I) (“For the purposes of this section, proof of verifying the employment authorization of an 
employee through the basic pilot program creates a rebuttable presumption that an employer did not intentionally 
employ an unauthorized alien or knowingly employ an unauthorized alien.”).  
112 See Ordinance 2006-18, § 5A (“It is unlawful for any person or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the 
City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come 
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise expressly 
permitted by federal law.”). 
113 Id. § 4(A). 
114 Id. § 3(E). 
115 Id. § 4(B)(4). Employers who violate of the employment provisions of Ordinance 2006-18 lose a business license 
for three days. Id. Any subsequent violations of the employment provisions of Ordinance 2006-18 cause the 
employer to lose its business license for twenty days. Id. § 4(B)(7).  
116 Id. § 4(B)(5) (“The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall not suspect the business permit of a business entity 
if, prior to the date of the violation, the business entity had verified the work authorization of the alleged unlawful 
worker(s) using the Basic Pilot Program.”).  See Couch, supra note 13, at 644-45 for a brief explanation of the 
framework of Ordinance 2006-18. 
117 Id. § 4(C). 
118 Id. §4.B.(3). 
119 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1036. 
120 496 F. Supp. 2d at 477. 
121 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354.  
122 Id. at 355. 
123 Id.  
124 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (“Like the California law at issue in DeCanas, the Act does 
not determine ‘who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant 
may remain.”); Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 524 n.45 (The Hazleton Ordinance “do[es] not regulate who can or 
cannot be admitted to the country or the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”) 
125 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.  
126 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 23-211(8). 
127 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.  
128 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355. 
129 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 524 n.45. 
130 Id.  
131 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 
132 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.   
133 Id. at 1048.  
134 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518. 
135 Id. 
136 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.  
137 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004).  
138 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.  
139 Id. at 1046.  
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140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1051. 
142 Id. (“In light of the disproportionate responsibilities and burdens of the states, Congress could reasonably 
conclude that states are better equipped than Congress to judge which licenses to sanction, and how much.  It left the 
strong deterrence of licensing sanctions to individual states to implement in their own circumstances.”). 
143 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (“[I]t would not make sense for Congress in limiting the state’s authority to allow states and municipalities the 
opportunity to provide the ultimate sanction, but no lesser penalty.”) 
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 H.R. No. 99-682(I) at 5662 (emphasis added). 
149 Lozano, 496 F.Supp.2d at 520. 
150 Id. 
151 H.R. No. 99-682(I) at 5662.  
152 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 520 (“The other pre-emption exception is for ‘fitness to do business laws’ such as 
state form labor contractor laws or forestry laws.”) 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 519-20. 
155 Id. at 520. 
156 Compare Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519-20 with Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.  
157 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1051; Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519.  
158 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
159 Compare Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 519-20, with Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
160 Lozano, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 520.  
161 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.  
162 Id. at 1057. See also Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 149 n.4. In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the IRCA, noting that the House Report did not itself claim to embody an understanding 
shared by the entire Congress.  The majority opinion questioned the extent to which the House Report assists in an 
understanding of the savings clause. For whatever prominence the House Report might have in a dispute centering 
on the IRCA, the Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastic Compounds relegated treatment of the House Report to a 
footnote.  At least in this respect, the Arizona Contractors decision may be more consistent (than Lozano) with the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of the IRCA’s legislative history. 
163 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mmgt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67).  
164 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 521. 
165 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. 
166 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) (“Congress’ inclusion of an express pre-emption clause 
does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.” (emphasis in original)); Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (“[N]either an express pre-emption provision nor a savings 
clause bars the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.” (internal citations omitted)); Freightliner Corp. 
v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995) (“[A]n express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’ – i.e., 
supports a reasonable inference – that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters.”). 
167 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (“Conflict preemption turns on the second form of conflict, 
where state law ‘stands as an obstacle’ to federal law.”). 
168 Id. at 1052.  Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(C) with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e).  
169 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-54.  Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(C) with 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(e).  
170 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1053-54.  Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(J) with 8 
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U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3). 
171 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1055. 
172 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526. 
173 Ordinance 2006-18 § 4(E)(1) (“The discharge of any employee who is not an unlawful worker by a business 
entity in the City is an unfair business practice if, on the date of the discharge, the business entity was employing an 
unlawful worker.  The discharged worker shall have a private cause of action in the Municipal Court of Hazleton 
against the business entity for the unfair business practice.”). 
174 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526.  It is not obvious that the differences highlighted above are “irreconcilable” or in 
actual conflict, however. See, e.g., Rice v. Norman Williams Co, 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Freightliner Corp., 514 
U.S. at 289.  Additionally, according to one author, “[t]here has been considerable case law indicating that 
invalidation based on conflict preemption should not extend beyond the necessarily obvious conflict in the case 
before the court.”  Lounsbury, supra note 11, at 441.  
175 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 528.  
176 Id.  
177 Id. at 526-28.  
178 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.  
179 Implied conflict preemption analysis necessarily requires an analysis of both the federal law and the state or local 
law in question. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000).  
180 Ordinance 2006-18 § 4(E)(1). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Enforcement is limited to a revocation or denial of business licenses. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(C). 
184 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363.  DeCanas has been cited by the Supreme Court to reinforce the proposition that state 
laws that place additional burdens on immigrants are unconstitutional as preempted by federal law. See Toll, 458 
U.S. at 1 (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6) (“State regulation not congressionally sanction that discriminates 
against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by 
Congress.”); see also Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 898. 
185 This was among the findings of the court in Lozano, noting that the Hazleton Ordinance “still provides for strict 
liability, without the element of knowledge, with regard to the civil cause of action it creates.  The federal IRCA 
statute does not create such a cause of action.” 496 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (internal citations omitted).  
186 This conclusion is shared by Couch, supra note 11, at 660, who noted that the Hazleton Ordinance “disrupts [a] 
balance by expanding upon IRCA’s regulatory scheme, imposing additional obligations on employers and subjecting 
them to additional penalties.” 
187 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.  Any burden the Arizona Act imposes on employers is 
authorized by federal law.  Id. See also Schuck, supra note 11, at 80 (“[It] is hard to see how state employer 
sanctions provisions that are carefully drafted to track the federal employer sanctions law can be inconsistent with it 
– unless we take ineffective enforcement to be the ‘real’ federal policy from which state law must not deviate.”).  
188 DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357.  
189 Id. (citing Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).  
190 Id. at 358. 
191 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 424 U.S. at 1048 (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357). 
192 Id. (emphasis added).  See also Scheck, supra note 11, at 87-88 (“DeCanas also made clear, however, that 
establishing field preemption of state immigration law required an express statement of congressional intent, and that 
Congress had not voiced its desire to preempt this entire field.”).  
193 Arizona Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.  
194 Id. Additionally, “Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that 
matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.” Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 288 (“Such reasoning is a variant of 
the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”).  Because Congress included in the IRCA a provision 
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expressly addressing the issue of preemption, a court need not “infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws [by 
occupation of the field] from the substantive provisions” of the IRCA. Id. 
195 496 F. Supp. 2d at 523 (citing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147-48).  
196 535 U.S. at 147.  
197 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 525. (“[C]ongress has in fact enacted a comprehensive scheme with regard to the 
employment of unauthorized aliens and occupies the field to the exclusion of state law.”).  
198 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 523.  
199 Kati L. Griffith, Comment, A Supreme Stretch: the Supremacy Clause in the Wake of IRCA and Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 127, 138 (2008); see also Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 
254 (2d Cir. 2006) (Walker, J., concurring) (“Courts should not have to guess how often and to what extent 
employers and their illegal alie employees will break the law in order to decide a case.”).     
200 Couch, supra note 11, at 658.  
201 Id. at 657-58.  Several decisions have interpreted the IRCA “extremely narrowly, so as to provide undocumented 
aliens greater rights than they would be afforded were IRCA to prevent state law.” Id. at 658. “In other words, 
courts around the country have decidedly interpreted IRCA not to restrict undocumented aliens’ access to state 
employment and medical benefits.” Id. (emphasis in original).  
